DEREK PEREBOOM’S ARGUMENT AGAINST FREE WILL
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24919/2522-4700.41.18Keywords:
Derk Pereboom, fatalism, free will problem, compatibilism, analytical philosophy, incompatibilism, determinism.Abstract
Summary. The purpose of the article is to analyze one of the main arguments against Derek Perebum’s “free will” and conduct a critical analysis of its components. The idea consists of 4 imaginary situations, from the most fantastic to the closest to reality. Methodology. During the analysis and presentation of the considered problem, methodological bases of research became the theory of argumentation, heuristics, critical thinking, and hermeneutic analysis. Scientific novelty. Interest in the study of the "theory of consciousness" has not abated for several decades. Each time a wave of discussions is rising, especially on the phenomenon of “freedom of will”, which is one aspect of this broad field. Since this problem is not studied deeply enough in our scientific community, I chose this author and his argument given the exciting and unconventional approach to this topic. The argument itself also focuses on one of the most common areas – compatibility, which combines determinism and free will. The boom, in turn, defends the position of rigid determinism. Conclusions. D. Perebum uses the method of “thought experiment”, as famous in analytical philosophy as “philosophical zombie” by David Chalmers. The “experiment” itself provides for changes in one (rarely – several) properties of our world so that we can trace the changes that will cause this modification. Such an act works with possible worlds, and the main criterion is the reachability of this changed world from our world. All 4 cases are reduced to manipulation; each of them appeals to intuition at the expense of how much a person (in the example – Dr. Plum) is morally responsible for their actions in connection with external influences. All 4 cases lead us to another argument, which can be formulated as follows: a decision-making agent can take responsibility if he has full control over his past and that there are no phenomena that can unpredictably affect decision-making.
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